«…На основе имеющихся данных установлено, что осколки ракеты, обнаруженной на площади и вокруг нее, являются осколками ракеты СС-26. Это подтверждается как визуальными характеристиками, так и серийными номерами, обнаруженными на фрагментах и наблюдаемых на фотографиях.
СС-26 – современная тактическая баллистическая ракета, находящаяся на вооружении только Российской Федерации. Эти ракеты способны поразить выбранные цели на расстоянии сотен километров с точностью около десяти метров.
Заключения
На основе своего расследования миссия выносит следующие заключения:
- Стан Сториманс умер примерно в 10.45 12 августа 2008 г. в результате смертельных ранений, вызванных 5-мм пулей из противопехотной начинки кассетного оружия.
- По пространству вокруг площади в Гори размером приблизительно 300 на 500 метров ударила кассетная бомба, в которой находились примерно 20 взрывных зарядов, разбросавших большое количество небольших пуль. Г-н Сториманс и по крайней мере еще четыре человека были смертельно ранены. Еще несколько человек получили тяжелые и легкие ранения.
- Данная кассетная бомба была запущена тактической баллистической ракетой типа СС-26 с территории Российской Федерации.
Миссия установила, что таковыми были обстоятельства гибели г-на Сториманса.»
Из Доклада Миссии по расследованию гибели г-на Сториманса,
Министерство иностранных дел Нидерландов, Гаага, 20 октября 2008 г.
http://www.minbuza.nl/dsresource?objectid=buzabeheer:32226&type=pdf
no subject
Date: 2009-09-24 09:21 pm (UTC)no subject
Date: 2009-09-25 12:56 am (UTC)Re:а сколько людей погибло с другой стороны?
Date: 2009-09-25 05:04 am (UTC)Re: И от чьих ракет?
С кассетными зарядами? По моему Грузия честно призналась что использовала кассетные заряды против наступающих частй и подразделений в районе Джавы
Если имеется ввиду обстрел Цхинвали из РЗСО типа БМ21 "Град"- то по источникам с российской стороны Цхинвали обстреливали и с российской стороны, включая придаными ВС РФ, бандформированиями.
Не уверен, что "югоосетины" к тому моменты еще спали.
no subject
Date: 2009-09-24 09:32 pm (UTC)cluster bomb (воен.
- кассетная бомба.
С уважением,
Константин
no subject
Date: 2009-09-24 11:11 pm (UTC)no subject
Date: 2009-09-24 09:39 pm (UTC)no subject
Date: 2009-09-24 10:33 pm (UTC)Честно-честно !!!
Date: 2009-09-24 11:29 pm (UTC)специально перекрашенного "под г-на Сториманса"г-на Сториманса. Правда-правда !!! Я Вам врать не стану !!! Ну а не верите - значит Вы русофоб, батенька !!!Re: Честно-честно !!!
Date: 2009-09-25 06:58 am (UTC)оригинал предидущего перевода гуглом от Роберта Гейтс
Date: 2009-09-25 03:00 am (UTC)Well, the administration was divided in its assessment of what was
going on in the Soviet Union but unified in what we were going to do
about it. I think it's fair to say that Secretary of Defense Cheney30,
deputy Secretary of State Eagleburger31, Condi Rice and I all felt
that reforms were going to fail and that Gorbachev was presiding over
a process he couldn't control.
Until fairly well into the process we also saw that much of what he
had done was reversible had he been replaced by somebody else. And so
we were more skeptical that his reforms would work.
However, we did not at all disagree with the approach that the
President and secretary Baker and Brent Scowcroft advocated which was
to get a deal with them. And we had to interact with these folks so we
could help manage this process from the West.
There was no disagreement on managing the process of collapse. We
wanted to manage the relationship in a way that contributed to the
continuing change in the Soviet Union and there was no disagreement in
the administration on that. I was very pessimistic from the beginning
regarding the belief that Gorbachev's economic reforms would work.
There was too much information coming to the CIA about what the
consequences of his changes were in terms of manufacturing, in terms
of research and development, and everything else. And there was a sort
of new plan every six months so he could continue to tear up the
bureaucracy in terms of trying to find something that would work.
And each time he did that the situation got worse. Where he went
farther than I anticipated was in his political changes and his
willingness at the very end to actually end the monopoly of the
communist party on politics in the Soviet Union. And I would
acknowledge that I was more pessimistic on that and I did not think
that he would go as far as he did.
But I think in terms of the administration as whole. During my
confirmation hearings in 1991 there was a lot of allegations that the
Soviet Union was about to collapse, and there was an acquisition from
the democratic side, democratic senators, that the CIA had
overestimated the Soviet threat.
And I think as we look back and dissect what was going on in the
Soviet Union, the level of resources they devoted to the military, and
the quality of much of their military in those days, I don't think we
exaggerated at all.
One of the examples that was brought home to me by one of the arms
control people was when the INF treaty was implemented and Soviets had
to destroy their SS 20s.
They launched virtually almost all of those SS 20s, they withdrew from
Eastern Europe, and they didn't have a single launch failure. We did
not have that good of a record when we withdrew our medium range
missiles.
no subject
Date: 2009-09-26 08:09 am (UTC)no subject
Date: 2009-09-26 06:14 pm (UTC)высокоточным оружием
Date: 2009-09-28 12:48 pm (UTC)